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There is a charge sometimes made in metaphysics that particular
commitments are ‘hypothetical’, ‘dubious’ or ‘suspicious’. There have
been two analyses given of what this consists in—due to Crisp (2007)
and Cameron (2011). The aim of this paper is to reject both analyses
and thereby show that there is no obvious way to press the objection
against said commitments that they are ‘dubious’ and objectionable.
Later in the paper I consider another account of what it might be to be
‘dubious’, and argue that this too fails. I use Bigelow’s (1996)
Lucretian properties as a vehicle for the discussions of dubiousness
that follow. As a consequence, the paper ends up offering a partial
defense of Lucretianism.
Keywords: presentism; Lucretianism; hypothetical properties;
dubious properties; suspicious properties; point beyond; Sider;
Cameron
1. Introducing Dubiousness
Some ontological commitments are described as ‘dubious’. To get a sense of
what is meant by the term ‘dubious’, I want to first introduce an instance of an
allegedly dubious property. This, in turn, requires us to consider a brief overview
of the truthmaker objection to presentism.
Presentism is the thesis that:
(PR) Only present objects exist2
Let us make the perfectly sensible supposition:
(TRUTH) There are true propositions about the past
Finally, and for the sake of argument, let us adopt truthmaker maximalism:
(TM) Every true proposition has an existing entity as its truthmaker3
There is plainly a tension between these principles. Given TRUTH and TM
there must exist truthmakers for true propositions about the past. If PR is true,
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then the truthmakers for truths about the past must be presently existing entities.
However, there are no obvious present entities that look to be suitable
truthmakers for true talk about the past. This suggests we must give up on one (or
more) of the three principles.
This suggestion can be repudiated if we are prepared to endorse particular
sorts of presently existing properties: for instance, the (so-called) ‘Lucretian’
properties, posited by Bigelow.4 According to the Lucretian, what makes
propositions about the past true are presently existing properties that are
instantiated by the world—properties of the form ‘having included so-and-so’.
Thus, what makes true , there were dinosaurs . is that the world instantiates
the property having included dinosaurs.
(One worry worth mentioning simply to set it aside, is that the Lucretian
move is a bad move methodologically. The methodology seems to be: find an
ungrounded truth, posit a new truthmaker. But, simply finding that we lack
truthmakers on a given picture of reality does not (or should not) license a move
to positing some new entity. Such moves are simply methodologically suspect.
As I say, I don’t want to deal with this accusation here. My concern in this paper
is with the charge that there is something suspect about the natures of some of the
properties posited.)
The objection made by Sider (and others) is that these Lucretian properties
are “dubious”, “hypothetical” and “suspicious”.5 The claim is that a proper
ontology ought to invoke only a particular kind of entity. A proper ontology
ought to include, ‘[o]nly categorical, or occurent, properties and relations.
Categorical properties involve what objects are actually like, whereas
hypothetical properties ‘point beyond’ their instances’. (Sider 2001, 41)
In the process of explicating what is objectionable about the Lucretian
properties, Sider likens Lucretian properties to various other posits, all of which
are also said to be dubious. The complete list is:
(i) Lucretian properties
(ii) Ungrounded dispositions
(iii) Ungrounded counterfactual properties
(iv) Laws of nature that are universally possessed properties (being such that
all Fs must be Gs)
(v) Primitive spatial operators, analogous to tense operators
(vi) Primitive personal operators, analogous to tense operators
There is something appealing about the idea that each of the properties on this
list (each of (i)–(iv)) have something in common; that each of them ‘point
beyond’, in Sider’s (2001, 41) words. There is, intuitively, some kind of
difference between the ‘dubious’ properties and the ordinary sorts of property
with which we are more familiar: being red, being round—and so on. Because of
this, my opponent claims, we should reject the dubious properties.
As intuitive as this is, it’s far from a compelling argument. There are two
obvious problems. First, it’s hard to see what, exactly, these supposedly dubious
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posits have in common. What feature is it that the properties on the list share?
This talk of ‘pointing beyond’ is all very well, but it hardly amounts to an
analysis.
Second, even if we can identify a feature shared by each of (i)–(iv) why is it
objectionable? Merely locating some feature, f, shared by each of (i)–(iv) and
describing each of (i)–(iv) as ‘dubious’ in virtue of ‘being f’ seems little better
than name-calling. So, let us suppose that there is some feature that unifies the
dubious properties: we must then explain why we should try to avoid positing
them.
It is less obvious—to me, at any rate—that (v) and (vi) belong on a list of
suspect entities. Both (v) and (vi) are operators. It is hard to see how a semantic
operator can be troublesome in precisely the same way as a property. With that in
mind, this paper will not comment further on primitive operators of any sort, and
will focus on the properties listed in (i)–(iv).6
Each of the terms (‘hypothetical’, ‘dubious’ and ‘suspicious’) that Sider
introduces are then used by later authors to describe Lucretian properties and the
other properties on the list. The result is that we have a single concept and three
different terms used to refer to it. In this paper I slide between the terms, treating
them as synonyms, picking the one most appropriate to context.7 This is an
unfortunate state of affairs, but I prefer to use philosophers’ terms as they use
them, rather than substituting other terms.
The view that there is nothing shared by each of (i)– (iv) in virtue of which
they are objectionable is not new, having been (briefly) defended by Kierland
and Monton (2007). However, the argument supplied by Kierland and Monton
does not deal with the positions taken by either Crisp (2007) or Cameron (2011)
(or the analysis considered in section 4). In this paper, I take these positions in
turn and also consider another, reasonably intuitive, account of what the
‘dubiousness’ objection might consist in. For the most part I shall focus on
Lucretianism. If I can demonstrate that Lucretianism does not satisfy either of
the proscribed definitions of what it is to be dubious, then this gives us a
counter-example to the claim that the analyses given by Crisp and Cameron
specify some feature shared by each of (i)– (iv) and in virtue of which these
properties ought to be rejected.8
Before we move to the substance of the paper, some notes about the strategy.
First, in what follows, I will argue that there are some properties that we might
posit that satisfy the proposed analyses of what is to point beyond, but that do not
point beyond; and that some of the proposed analyses fail to generate the result
that Lucretian properties point beyond. In arguing in this way I am assuming that
there is nothing conceptually incoherent about the idea of a Lucretian property—
that Lucretian properties are not themselves contradictory properties. Were
opponents of Lucretian properties of a mind that Lucretian properties are
contradictory, then I assume that they would say so—rather than making the
opaque and far weaker assertion that these properties are ‘suspicious’. Moreover,
none of the analyses offered in the literature do anything to try to show that
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 99
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
2.1
9.4
4.2
10
] a
t 1
5:4
6 1
5 M
arc
h 2
01
4 
there’s anything contradictory about Lucretian properties. We are simply invited
to think that properties that point beyond violate a constraint on what kinds of
entity can be included in a ‘safe and sane ontology’.9
Second, I am not assuming that all of the various properties that I consider are
metaphysically possible. I am assuming that when considering the charge of
dubiousness, we are at the point of theory-choice. It is epistemically possible that
Lucretianism is true; epistemically possible that it is false. After all, the view
appears internally coherent. Are there, then, good constraints on a ‘safe and sane’
ontology that rule some posits ‘dubious’? According to some, there are, and the
Lucretian properties fall foul of these and so should be rejected. To test these
constraints (to see whether they are good constraints), we should apply them to a
range of test cases. We should see whether or not these constraints deliver results
that accord with our intuitions about what it is to ‘point beyond’ in a range of cases.
Thus, although I will ask the reader to consider cases of the form ‘suppose that such
and such a property were actual . . . ’, I do not require these counterfactuals to be
analysed in terms of what is metaphysically possible. Rather, my aim is simply to
see whether or not the proposed analyses correctly classify a range of putative
properties. And whilst the properties I consider are very strange—in some cases, at
least—it does not seem incoherent to think that there are such properties. In that
case, we should consider whether or not they pass the constraints on a safe and sane
ontology and so ask whether or not they point beyond.
2. Crisp on the hypothetical and categorical
The first analysis of what it is to be hypothetical is due to Crisp (2007).10 To set-
up Crisp’s account of the distinction between the hypothetical and the
categorical, we require an understanding of Crisp’s terminology. Following
Bealer, Crisp (2007, 94) abbreviates the singular term ‘the proposition that S’
with ‘[S]’ and allows that we may refer ‘to the property of being an x such that x
is F with the singular term ‘[Fx]x’’. Crisp treats ‘is possible’, ‘is necessary’ and ‘is
past’ as predicates and suggests that these predicates denote properties. The result
is that ‘S[S]’ is to be read as saying that ‘the proposition [S] has the property of
being possible’. Similarly, ‘WAS[S]’ is to be read as saying that ‘the proposition
[S] has the property of being past’. We may then analyze properties like the
Lucretian properties in terms of properties of propositions.
With this terminology in mind, Crisp (2007, 95) states what he takes to be the
distinction between hypothetical and categorical properties.
F is a hypothetical property ¼ df. for some properties G and H (such that H is not
equivalent to the property being true), F ¼ [H[Gx]]x.
Finally, allow that any non-hypothetical property is categorical.
To illustrate how this is intended to work, consider the property of being
formerly short. Intuitively, this looks like the type of property that should be
hypothetical. The property being formerly short seems like the kind of property
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that points beyond its instances. Does Crisp’s analysis get the right result? Can
we represent the property of being formerly short, in the way specified above?
According to Crisp (2007, 95), we can. Allow that ‘WAS’ denotes the property is
past. Further, suppose that, ‘S’ stands for the predicate ‘is short’. The analysis of
being formerly short is: [WAS[Sx]]x. This means that the property being formerly
short is hypothetical because we can—and have—represented it using an
instance of F ¼ [H[Gx]]x.
In contrast, the property ‘being short’, which intuitively is not hypothetical,
cannot be represented in this fashion. As Crisp notes (2007, 95), for no properties
G and H is it the case that being short is identical with the property [H[Gx]]x. This
is the desired result. The property being formerly short is hypothetical; the
property being short is not.
2.1. Against Crisp
Crisp’s strategy fails. It leads to the misclassification of certain paradigmatically
categorical properties as hypothetical. To see how Crisp’s strategy fails, consider
two putative counterexamples here: the first is an instance of a logical property,
the second a somewhat arcane non-logical property.
2.1.1. Logical Properties
Consider the proposition , q . . There is, trivially, a property of being a
proposition; this property is instantiated by , q . . There is also, trivially, a
property being self-identical. Finally, and given the instantiation of these
properties, we may also say that there is a property of being a self-identical
proposition. Let us represent this last property—being a self-identical
proposition—with F. Let us represent the property being a proposition with G
and the property being self-identical with H. In that case, we can analyze F—the
property of being a self-identical proposition. Formally: F ¼ [H[Gx]]x.
Whilst I concede that the property being a self-identical proposition is a
strange property to treat as the subject of our discussion, it is not incoherent to
think that there is such a property.11 Equally, it is clear that, intuitively, the
property being self-identical to the proposition that , q . is not a property that
‘points beyond’. (Nor, crucially for our purposes given Crisp’s analysis, is the
property being self-identical the property of being true. It is consistent to think
that , q . is false but that nonetheless it instantiates the property being a self-
identical proposition.) We have an instance of a property that intuitively does not
‘point beyond’, but that satisfies Crisp’s analysis of what it is to be hypothetical.
Crisp’s analysis fails.
An opponent might wish to object that Crisp’s analysis should not be taken to
extend to merely logical properties and that because of this the proposed
counterexample is of no value. Certainly, in setting up his case, Crisp does not
discuss logical properties. That being the case, it would be reasonable to treat this
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 101
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as a restricted analysis of what it is to be hypothetical that extends only as far as
non-logical properties.
I don’t think that we should endorse this move, however. First, there is no
obvious reason to restrict the account of hypotheticality in this way. We have
been given no reason to think that logical properties are suitably different from
non-logical properties such that this account of hypotheticality might not apply
equally well to the logical properties. Crudely: there is a difference between
logical and non-logical properties, but why think that this difference is salient to
the question of hypotheticality? There is a difference between mass properties
and shape properties but both—or so we may suppose—may be classified as
intrinsic. The difference between mass and shape is not salient to their
intrinsicality. Absent any reason to think that logical properties are different in a
way that is salient to hypotheticality, it seems reasonable to allow them as
counterexamples.
Second—though connected—there seem to be cases of logical properties
that should be treated as hypothetical. Laws of nature that are universally
possessed properties seem to ‘point beyond’. There are, of course, logical laws.
Were these universally instantiated properties, then these too would seem to
‘point beyond’.
Consider, by way of example, a property of the relation of equality: the
property of symmetry, such that, for any a and b, a ¼ b iff b ¼ a. This property is a
law-like property: it is a law of logic, if you will, that a ¼ b iff b ¼ a. It would be
highly inappropriate to think of this as a law that is a universally possessed
property. That is, we should not say that the logical law that a ¼ b iff b ¼ a is a
matter of every entity instantiating a property of the form, it must be the case that
a ¼ b iff b ¼ a. Laws of nature that are universally possessed properties of the
form being such that all Fsmust beGs point beyond; so too do laws of logic that are
universally possessed properties of the form it must be the case that a ¼ b iff b ¼ a.
Of course, if there are cases where it seems that logical properties would be
hypothetical, were they instantiated, then it seems that we have good reason to
think that any analysis of what it is to be hypothetical ought to extend to logical
properties. And, in that case, we should not restrict Crisp’s analysis to the merely
non-logical properties. That renders the suggested counterexample salient once
again.
2.1.2. Non-logical properties
Let us turn to the second counter-example. I consider this further counterexample
because I suspect a critic may be able to exploit the fact that the properties I’ve
discussed are (trivial) logical properties. Whilst I don’t see quite how the
argument will go, I nonetheless retain the concern that this will prove a fertile
ground for a determined opponent.
Numbers, if they exist, exist outside space and time—they are abstract
objects. Numbers are also acausal; we may say that they have the property of
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being acausal. Some numbers have the property of being prime. 3, for instance,
has this property. Allow that the property being prime is represented by G and
that the property being acausal is represented by H: the property of being
acausally prime can then be analyzed as [H[Gx]]x. In just the same way that we
analysed being formerly short as a case where the property WAS applied to a
proposition; in this case, we can analyse being acausally prime as a case where
the property of being acausal applies to a proposition, [Gx]x.
But, once again, the property of being acausally prime does not seem to be a
property that points beyond. It seems to be nothing more than the property of
being a prime number that does not cause anything. This property is strange. It is
also a merely abundant property—or so I assume. But there is nothing incoherent
about it. So then: there is—or seems to be—an intuitive notion of what it is to
‘point beyond’. Crisp’s analysis wrongly predicts that being acausally prime
‘points beyond’. Crisp’s analysis therefore fails to track the notion of ‘pointing
beyond’ and so Crisp’s analysis fails.
There is an obvious (though unpersuasive) line of response: properties of the
sort that I mention, don’t exist. Take the property of being acausally prime. We
have any number of reasons to think that this is not a property. For one thing, we
may well dislike a commitment to the existence of numbers; for another, we might
not think that being acausal is a genuine property. So, because we do not think that
the property of being acausally prime is actually a property at all, it does notmatter
whether the property satisfies our analysis of what it is to be suspicious: the
property is non-actual and so not a candidate for concern.
As I say, this line of response is not persuasive. The strategy outlined in the
introduction of the paper explains why. The opponent of the supposedly
hypothetical properties does not think that the hypothetical properties are actual.
Rather, their contention is that at the point of theory choice we rule out particular
properties because they are not elements of a ‘safe and sane’ ontology. And,
although we may not think that there is a property of being acausally prime, there
is nothing (obviously) internally inconsistent about a theory that posits such a
property. If we are to reject such properties, then we must do so via argument and
do so at the point of theory choice. One suggestion would be that we rule-out
these properties by showing that we should not think that such properties belong
in a safe and sane ontology. And, as such, alongside applying other
considerations, we should see whether or not the properties point beyond. So
far as I can tell we are perfectly within our rights to consider whether or not such
properties as being acusally prime point beyond, regardless of whether or not we
conclude that they are actual. We must, after all, decide whether or not to include
such properties in our ontology and we may only do so if they are elements of a
safe and sane ontology.
Intuitively, of course, such properties do not point beyond—though are very odd
and should probably be rejected for other reasons.But, of course, all of thismeans that
Crisp’s account ofwhat it is to point beyond is one that fails to capture the notion that
we’re after. The simple point is this: we have an intuitive conception of what it is to
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‘point beyond’, a conception that Crisp has tried to analyze. I claim that Crisp has
failed because there are putative properties that are not ones that ‘point beyond’, but
that are putative properties that satisfy the analysis.
3. Cameron on Dubiousness
Cameron talks of properties being dubious, rather than hypothetical or
suspicious, so we shall now switch terms. Following Cameron (2011, 58) let
us also switch examples. Let us, ‘talk about the property being such as to have
been a child as had by me to ground the truth of , Ross was a child . ’. We
switch in order to obviate the charge, made by Merricks (2007, 135), that
Lucretian properties are doubly suspicious because they require ‘the world’ as a
bearer.
Cameron (2011, 60) suggests the Lucretian property of having been a child is
dubious because, ‘it points beyond its instances in the sense that a thing’s
presently having that property tells us nothing about the present intrinsic nature of
the thing’. The property having been a child doesn’t make a difference to how the
person instantiating the property is now; it makes a difference to how they were.
This type of property is not something that the presentist should allow, according
to Cameron, for the way that an object is now is the way that it is simpliciter.
Given presentism, if a property does not make a difference to how its bearer is
now, then it does not make a difference to that thing at all.
Cameron (2011, 62) formalizes this thought and endorses Intrinsic
Determination:
ID: For all objects x and properties F and times t, if x instantiates F at t, then x has
the intrinsic nature at t that it has partly in virtue of instantiating F at t.
If a property does not satisfy ID, then it is dubious and ought not to be
admitted into a sensible ontology. If a property does satisfy ID, then it is not
dubious and may be acceptable—pending other considerations. The property of
having been a child does not make a contribution to the present intrinsic nature
that a person has. It is no part of my present intrinsic nature to have been a child.
Rather, the property of having been a child makes a difference to how I was.
Lucretian properties fall foul of ID. They should be rejected. This is Cameron’s
view.
Charitably, Cameron’s view should not be read as giving a general account of
dubiousness since presently instantiatedungroundeddispositions presumablywould
make a difference to the present intrinsic natures of their bearers,were they to exist.
(Let us say that a disposition, D, is ungrounded just in case it cannot be reductively
analyzed in terms of a non-dispositional base.12Adisposition, then, is a property that
is a power to bring about somenew state. I take it that a powermaymake a difference
to the intrinsic nature of its bearer. This is especially vivid if one endorses pan-
dispositionalism according to which all properties are dispositional (see, for
instance, Bostock (2008)). In such a case, ungrounded dispositions would, I assume,
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make a difference to the intrinsic natures of their bearers; the property ofmass being
anobvious candidate power thatwouldmake a difference to the intrinsic nature of its
bearer but that is ‘dubious’ according to Sider’s original classification. This gives us
a perfectly good reason to reject Cameron’s account of what it is to be dubious.)
Nonetheless, I persevere here because I think that, even in the temporal case,
it’s interesting and important to note that Cameron’s analysis fails to articulate
what is supposed to be wrong with Lucretian properties.
3.1. Against Cameron
So far as I can see, Lucretian properties do make a difference to the present
intrinsic natures of their bearers. The notion of an intrinsic nature is not well-
defined in the wider literature. Unlike the concept of an intrinsic property, that
has been heavily scrutinized, we do not have even a working definition of what an
intrinsic nature is. And Cameron does not offer an analysis of what an intrinsic
nature of an object is.
This needn’t be a problem. It’s quite sufficient for an understanding of a view
that we have it suitably clarified. But, to the extent that I understand the notion of
an intrinsic nature, Lucretian properties do make a difference to the present
intrinsic nature of their bearers and that means that Cameron has not offered us a
reason to reject Lucretianism. In what follows, I explain why I think that we
should endorse this line of reasoning.
Cameron engages in a number of attempts to explicate the concept of an
intrinsic nature. I shall take each of Cameron’s explications in turn and show that,
on each, Lucretian properties make a difference to the present intrinsic nature of
their bearers. I conclude that Cameron’s line fails.
Here is Cameron’s (2011, 59) first pass at describing an intrinsic nature:
Properties should tell us about how the things that instantiate them are. But unless
we’re going to admit the existence of a property for every predicate (in which case
we shouldn’t be objecting to the existence of any property and, provided we’re
prepared to admit a state of affairs of a being F whenever any thing has any property
F, satisfying Truthmaker becomes very easy indeed) we need to place some
restrictions on the ways objects are that instantiation of properties should tell us
about. One natural restriction is to the intrinsic ways objects are. We’ll admit the
property being charged but not the property being a metre from the tallest Scotsman.
Why? Because instantiation of the latter property by an object – while it certainly
tells us something about how the object is – does not tell us anything about how it
intrinsically is: an object’s having that property tells us nothing about how the
object is in and of itself, it only tells us about how the object is in virtue of how its
surroundings are.
As Cameron has it, a dubious property—such as being a metre from the tallest
Scotsman—only tells us about how an object is in virtue of how its surroundings
are. In the case of the property being a metre from the tallest Scotsman, the
putative property does ‘tell us how the object is in virtue of how its surroundings
are’. These ‘surroundings’ are existing objects. One part of the surroundings is
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the tallest Scotsman, another part of the surroundings is the spatial relation
‘ . . . being one metre from . . . ’.
The most obvious way in which to identify ‘surroundings’ in the Lucretian case
would be the way that the world was: we would say that which Lucretian properties
are instantiated now depends upon how the world was. But there is an obvious
problem. Simply, ‘the way that the world was’ is not an existent—not, at least, if
presentism is true. And if ‘the way that the world was’ is not an existent, then we
ought not to say that ‘the way that the world was’ constitutes any part of the
‘surroundings’ of an object instantiating a Lucretian property. The ‘non-existent fat
man in the door-way’ is no part of my surroundings and, since past objects do not
exist, we should not think that they are, either. It is not the case, therefore, that
Lucretian properties only make a difference to their bearers in virtue of how their
surroundings are.
What we have with Lucretianism, then, is a scenario where it’s not the case
that a putative property of an object makes a difference to its bearer only in
virtue of its surroundings. But it certainly is the case that the property makes a
difference to the nature of its bearer; an object instantiating the property having
been a boy is non-identical to one (otherwise the same) that does not instantiate
that property. The only kinds of natures to which a property can make a
difference are intrinsic natures and non-intrinsic natures—at least, Cameron has
told us of no other sorts of nature. Since the Lucretian properties do make a
difference to the nature of their bearers, but do not make a difference to their
non-intrinsic natures, they must make a difference to the intrinsic natures of
their bearers.
3.2. Response: ‘Surroundings’
When Cameron speaks of ‘surroundings’ he doesn’t just mean existing things.
What Cameron means is that which Lucretian properties are now instantiated
depends upon which things existed. What we should care about is the fact that: if
therewere dinosaurs, then the world now instantiates the property having included
dinosaurs. And, if that’s right, then there’s an important sense in which the
Lucretian property having included dinosaurs exists in virtue of the world having
been a particular way. In that case, the property having included dinosaurs can’t
make a difference to the present intrinsic nature of the world.
This response is objectionable. The argument is of the form:
ARG: if a property, p, exists in virtue of some entity, q, that is distinct from p, then p
cannot make a difference to the present intrinsic nature of its bearer, O.
The idea here is that since the Lucretian property that now exists only exists
because of the way that the world was, so the Lucretian property cannot make a
difference to the present intrinsic nature of its bearer.
To see what is wrong with ARG, consider the property of mass that I have.
Had the Earth not existed, I would not have the mass that I do. In a sense, I only
exist in virtue of the Earth doing so and only instantiate the mass that I do in
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virtue of the Earth providing all of the resources that I needed to develop into my
current state. According to ARG, that should make my property of mass such that
it cannot make a difference to my present intrinsic nature: my property of mass
only exists in virtue of the Earth existing and generating those life-sustaining
conditions. But this is a bad result for ARG. My mass does make a difference to
my present intrinsic nature. In general terms, then, it is false to say that if a
property p is instantiated in virtue of some entity, q, that is distinct from p, then
p cannot make a difference to the intrinsic nature of its bearer, O.
(Consider, similarly, another case. An individual instantiating the property of
having long hair might have that property only in virtue of instantiating the
property of having hair. The latter seems a distinct property from the former
though is ontologically dependent upon it. But both make a difference to the
intrinsic nature of their bearer.)
A further response might distinguish two differing uses of ‘in virtue of’.
There is ontological dependence: the Lucretian properties depend for their
existence on particular past states of affairs. In contrast, it is also true to say that I
have my current mass in virtue of the state of the Earth. This latter use of ‘in
virtue of’ does not express a relation of ontological dependence; most likely it
expresses a relation of causal dependence. The lesson is this: in cases where we
use ‘in virtue of’ to mean ontological dependence, ARG is reasonable—in other
cases, it is not.
This response tries to defend ARG by noting that ARG is not problematic in
cases of ontological dependence. Ontological ‘in virtue of’ cases are cases where
we should endorse ARG; causal cases of ‘in virtue of’ are not. This might give
Cameron some means with which to respond.
This response is unhelpful to Cameron for ontological dependence cannot be
what is at issue in our discussion of Lucretianism. It’s not true that the present
instantiation of a Lucretian property depends ontologically on past objects—past
objects do not exist and ontological dependence is a relation that connects
existing objects. Thus, this offers Cameron no way to defend himself.
3.3. Intrinsic natures temporally and atemporally
Here’s another of Cameron’s (2011, 59) attempts to clarify ‘intrinsic nature’:
I’m assuming it makes sense to talk of the intrinsic nature of an object at a time as
opposed to the intrinsic nature of an object atemporally speaking. An object’s
instantiating being such as to have been a child at a time t does indeed tell us
something about the intrinsic nature of that object if by its intrinsic nature we mean
its atemporal intrinsic nature; but, I want to say, its instantiating that property now
doesn’t tell us about how it intrinsically is now. I need there to be a sensible
distinction, then, between the intrinsic nature of a thing at a time, and its intrinsic
nature across time. This should be no obstacle for the presentist; for a presentist the
notion definitely makes sense: the intrinsic nature of an object at a time just is what
its intrinsic nature per se is at that time. When t is present, the intrinsic nature of a
thing at t is just its intrinsic nature.
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Consider a particular time t. At time t, object O’s present intrinsic nature is just
identical to the intrinsic nature that O has at t. However, at some later time, t*, we
can still speak of O’s ‘intrinsic nature at t’. As Cameron (2011, 59) has it: ‘When t
is not present, the intrinsic nature of a thing at t is just the intrinsic nature it had/
will have when t was/comes to be present’. Because Cameron had the property of
being a boy, it’s now a part of Cameron’s atemporal intrinsic nature to have been a
boy. Thus, the Lucretian property having been a boy, as it’s now instantiated by
Cameron, makes a difference to Cameron’s atemporal intrinsic nature.
But as well as making a difference to atemporal intrinsic natures, Lucretian
properties also make a difference to present intrinsic natures. Suppose that
Cameron instantiates the property having been a boy. We’re agreed that this
makes a difference to Cameron’s atemporal nature. But this property having been
a boy also makes Cameron, now, rather different than had he not instantiated this
property: Cameron is now such as to have been a boy. That is a present difference
that the property makes. Cameron’s present nature would not be the same were he
to not instantiate the property for Cameron would, presently, not be such as to
have been a boy. That being the case I see no way that this distinction between
atemporal intrinsic nature and present intrinsic nature helps us to describe an
objection to Lucretianism.
3.4. Presentism and nature simpliciter
Here’s Cameron (2011, 60) on ‘intrinsic nature’ once more.
Properties should make a difference to how their bearers are intrinsically:
instantiating a property should make a difference to the intrinsic nature simpliciter
of the bearer at the time of instantiation. Since, for the presentist, my intrinsic nature
simpliciter is my present intrinsic nature, properties should make a difference to the
present intrinsic nature of their bearers. Lucretian properties don’t, so we shouldn’t
believe in them.
The Lucretian can endorse this characterization of an intrinsic nature and in
so doing block any putative objection. The bearer of a Lucretian property would
have a different present intrinsic nature were it to not instantiate that property. An
object that is such to have been a boy is presently such as to have been a boy, for
having been a boy is a property that it presently instantiates. In more detail:
suppose that presentism is true and focus upon two objects, O and O*. Suppose
that O and O* have all of the same properties aside from the fact that O
instantiates the property having been a boy whilst O* does not. Since presentism
is true, the present natures of these two objects exhaust their natures simpliciter.
O and O* are not qualitatively identical. O and O* instantiate different properties
and, because of that, have different natures. Because the present intrinsic nature
of an object exhausts its nature simpliciter, and the Lucretian property does not
make a difference to O merely in virtue of O’s surroundings, it seems right to say
that the property having been a boy makes a difference to the present intrinsic
nature of O.
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So far as I can tell, then, Lucretian properties do make a difference to the
present intrinsic nature of their bearers. Thus, if opponents of Lucretianism wish
to press this point, they ought to provide an independently plausible analysis of
what a present intrinsic nature is and demonstrate that Lucretian properties do not
make a difference to it.
3.5. Response: Intuitive conceptions and strategy
A final response on behalf of Cameron: in each of the above I’ve argued that
Lucretian properties would make a difference to the nature of a putative bearer.
But that’s trivial. After all, if I didn’t NOW have the property of having been a
child, I would NOW be different (since it wouldn’t be the case that I had been a
child). But all that follows from that is that the property makes a difference:
which is of course trivial – every property F makes a difference of some kind,
since if you lacked it you wouldn’t be F. The question is whether it makes a
difference to the present intrinsic nature. But this is a problem. In each of the
above I’ve simply shown that the properties make a difference to the nature of the
bearer, and then assumed that to be equivalent to the object’s nature. Now maybe
nature and present intrinsic nature are the same thing, in which case bad news for
Cameron – but (i) I can’t assume the equivalence and (ii) I haven’t argued for it.
I think that the imagined objector is right, to a point. I shouldn’t assume the
equivalence and I certainly haven’t argued for it. But the whole point of the
preceding has been to demonstrate that on the description given by Cameron, of
what a present intrinsic nature is, Lucretian properties make a difference to that.
If there is some other way to cash out Cameron’s view, then so be it; but we need
to be told what a present intrinsic nature is such that Lucretian properties don’t
make a difference to that. At the moment, I don’t see that we have that.
4. Properties and relational properties13
There is another way of approaching this issue. The properties that are supposed
to point beyond are, intuitively, relational properties. The property having been a
boy is, intuitively, one that requires not only Ross’ present self to exist, but also
that there exist a boy that is Ross’ past self and some appropriate temporal
relation that connects Ross’ present self to his past self. According to the
Lucretian, of course, the property having been a boy is not relational. According
to the Lucretian, the property having been a boy does not involve the existence of
any past boy or any temporal relation connecting that boy to Ross. Perhaps we
can use this idea to get to the heart of what is wrong with properties that are
dubious. To get this moving, consider an analogy.
Suppose that Elizabeth is a moon skeptic; she believes here-ism, the view that
only objects that exist here, exist at all. Nonetheless, she thinks it’s true that, the
moon is currently 360,000 km from the earth . . As a proponent of the truthmaker
principle, Elizabeth posits the following truthmaker: the earth’s instantiating the
non-relational property of being 360,000 km from the moon. This position, says our
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critic, is absurd. It is clearly false. There is also a way to explain why the position is
absurd. There is a strong intuition that the property of being 360,000 km from the
moon is relational. But because Elizabeth is a moon skeptic, for she endorses here-
ism, she denies the existence of the moon and so is committed to the relational
property being 360,000 km from the moon being non-relational.
And, says our critic, matters are the same in the Lucretian case (and cases
involving all of the other supposedly dubious properties). Intuitively, the property
of (for instance) having included dinosaurs, is a relational property; intuitively,
that the world included dinosaurs is a matter of how the world was. Because the
Lucretian denies the existence of that past state of the world, but still thinks that
the world instantiates the property having included dinosaurs, they are guilty of
positing a non-relational property to do the work of a relational property. By
doing so, they are just as guilty as Elizabeth, our moon-skeptic.
Tentatively, then, let us consider the following analysis of what it is to be
dubious.
DUB* A property is dubious iff it is intuitively relational but is treated/analyzed as a
non-relational property
This not only diagnoses what it is to be dubious, it also permits us an
explanation of why it is that we should avoid commitments to dubious properties.
Positing a dubious property requires us to give up on our intuitions concerning a
property: intuitively having been a boy is relational; the Lucretian says that it is
not. This violation of our intuitions is odd; it is in need of a defense and
justification. For all that has been said by the Lucretian, no good reason is
forthcoming for thinking that we should accept this blow to our intuitive
conception of what it is to have been a boy. We have our diagnosis, then, of what
it is to be dubious and why we should want to avoid properties that satisfy DUB*.
4.1. Response 1: Dubious but not intuitively relational
Recall that an analysis of what it is to be dubious is supposed to capture what is
objectionablewith eachof the dubious properties.Crucially, it doesn’t strikemeas at
all intuitive that ungrounded dispositional properties are intuitively relational but
analyzed as non-relational. As before, let us say that a disposition, D, is ungrounded
just in case it cannot be reductively analyzed in terms of a non-dispositional base.
More specifically, we might tentatively describe a disposition, borrowing from
Mumford (2006, 483) ‘To be a disposition is just to be directed towards some
possible manifestation’.
To say that a particular property is directed towards some possible state does not
intuitively (to me at any rate) seem to be the kind of property that is relational. The
ungrounded disposition may be directed towards particular possible states. But
beingdirected towards a particular state does not—tome, at least—seem to be a case
ofbeing related to some state; rather, it seems tobea caseofnothingmore thana non-
relational property being directed towards some particular state. So described,
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‘being directed towards’ is not, intuitively, a relational property; it is a simple sui
generis type of property—being directed towards.14
If I’m right, the proposed analysis fails to get to the core of what is wrong with
dubious properties in general (though see also §4.2). But I suspect that there is
room for disagreement, here. I can imagine a determined opponent thinking that,
intuitively, being directed towards is relational. In that case, both the Lucretian and
the proponent of ungrounded dispositions has work to do. What should they say?
Both the Lucretian and the proponent of ungrounded dispositions should deny
that we have intuitions to the effect that the properties are relational and, because
of that, I think that we should deny that we have an instance of an intuitively
relational property that is being treated as a non-relational property. To show this,
I’ll once again focus attention on the Lucretian properties. I assume that similar
remarks could be made in the dispositional case. Note that the Lucretian properties
are stipulatively introduced—albeit drawing on work by Lucretius—by Bigelow
(1996). Bigelow defines these properties as being ones that: are instantiated by the
world; exist within a presentist metaphysic; ground truths about the past, despite
the fact that the past does not exist. I think that I have a grip on what sort of a thing
that such a property would be. It is non-relational.15 It is monadic. If we are
allowed to indulge in a little metaphor, it is a property that has tense ‘built in to it’.
I do not see how we can reasonably suppose to have an intuition about this
property that it is relational. Given that the property is quite complex and not at all
the kind of property that one would naturally conceive of or entertain thoughts
about, it’s hard to see that we can have any pre-theoretical intuitions about it
whatsoever—let alone an intuition to the effect that the property is relational. It’s
equally hard to see that we can have a post-theoretic intuition about the Lucretian
properties because they have been defined and introduced to us as non-relational
in the way described above. If that’s right, then we cannot reasonably claim to
have the intuition that the Lucretian properties are relational.
An opponent might respond that, intuitively, the predicate ‘having been a
boy’ is a predicate that describes a feature of the world that is relational. The
Lucretian properties are not relational and so we’re obliged to give up our
intuition that the predicate ‘having been a boy’ describes a relational feature of
the world. The objection is now that we have an intuition about the ‘adicity’ of
what’s denoted by a particular term: intuitively, so we say, the predicate denotes a
binary relational property; the Lucretian claims that the predicate denotes a
monadic property.
To bring out why I think that this is a bad objection, I want to borrow from
Jonathan Schaffer’s discussion of causation. Schaffer (2005) defends the view
that causation is a quaternary, rather than a binary, relation. Much like the
Lucretian, then, Schaffer might be accused of flouting the intuitive adicity of
particular ascriptions of the English language. Intuitively, or so goes the claim,
causal ascriptions are binary. We say things of the form ‘Elizabeth caused the
bottle to smash’, which intuitively describes a relation of causation as standing
between some action of Elizabeth’s and the bottle’s smashing. This is a binary
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relation. Quaternary relations are not binary relations, so there is a cost to
claiming that causal relations are quaternary. Here is what Schaffer (2005, 297)
says in reply to this concern:
One might argue that binarity reflects the surface form of causal ascriptions . . .
surface form is treacherous. Some surface forms compress more complex logical
forms, and some logical forms reflect conceptual errors. One cannot read reality off
surface form.
One might argue that binarity reflects the intuitive adicity of causal relations. But
adicity is not so easily intuited. Our intuitive judgments merely provide evidence as
to the acceptability of utterances . . . Anything more is theory.
The same point applies in the Lucretian case. Schaffer’s imagined opponent
insists that, intuitively, the predicate ‘is the cause of’ is an ascription that picks
out a two-term relation in the world. My opponent in the Lucretian case seeks to
say that, intuitively, the ascription having been a boy picks out a relational
property—a two-term relation in the world. Like Schaffer, I deny that adicity is
so obvious. Like Schaffer I think that we have an ascription—in this case, ‘having
been a boy’—and like Schaffer I think that the adicity of what it denotes is not
readily intuited—it requires metaphysical theorizing to determine what sort of
property/relation is denoted by the predicate. The Lucretian theorizes that this is a
non-relational property. If my opponent wishes to object then some argument
must be forthcoming that shows that what the ascription denotes needs to be
relational for some theoretical purposes. As it stands, it will not do to simply
insist that we can intuit that what the term ‘having been a boy’ describes is a
relational property.
4.2. Response 2: Non-relational but not dubious
In section 4.1, I argued that the proposed analysis failed in the left-to-right,
direction: the supposedly dubious properties don’t satisfy the right-hand-side of the
analysis because they are not ‘intuitively relational’. Suppose that I’m wrong.
Suppose that there is a way to articulate what is meant by ‘intuitively relational’
that allows the argument against Lucretianism. In what follows I present a case in
which a property, combined with other ontological commitments, satisfies the
analysis given of what it is to be dubious, but is not a property that ‘points beyond’.
The structure of the case is as follows. I show that, coupling distributional
properties to Priority Monism (described by Schaffer (2010)), leads to an
‘intuitively relational’ property being analyzed as a non-relational property—but
that this distributional property need not thereby ‘point beyond’. Because of this,
I conclude that the analysis of what it is to be dubious is one that fails.
Priority Monism is the view that only one object is fundamental: the world.
Tables and chairs, cats and flares: these are parts of the world. They are
derivative. Of course, the world is heterogeneous. That is, different parts have
different qualities. The Priority Monist (Monist, hereafter, as I do not discuss
any other form of Monism) must account for this. One of Jonathan Schaffer’s
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(2010, 59) preferred routes to accounting for this heterogeneity is the positing of
distributional properties.
The most frequently used device used for introducing distributional
properties is that of a domino. It is natural to think of a domino instantiating
different color properties at different parts of its surface. It is by virtue of the
domino instantiating these different properties at different places that we may
truthfully say of the domino that, ‘it is polka-dotted’. But rather than positing
these distinct properties, each located at some different part of the domino, we
can posit a single property being-polka-dotted, instantiated by the domino. This
property—this single distributional property—accounts for how the domino is
across its surface. In the same way, then, the Monist can posit a single
distributional property to describe how the world is across its entirety.
With that in mind, consider the intuitively relational property resting on top
of. As I say, intuitively, this property is relational. But we saw, above, that the
nature of the world is fixed by the world instantiating a particular distributional
property. In this case, the property resting on top of is not relational; at least, it
can be given a reductive analysis by recourse to the distributional property that is
instantiated by the world. For it to be true that ‘the cup is resting on top of the
desk’, what we require is the existence of the world and its instantiating the non-
relational distributional property: the single property that fixes the nature of the
world throughout its entirety. Thus, what it is for the property resting on top of to
be instantiated is for the world to instantiate a particular distributional property.
Such a distributional property is ultimately non-relational because it requires
only the existence of the world. Thus we find that an intuitively relational
property can be given a non-relational, reductive analysis. Distributional
properties of this sort do not ‘point beyond’ in any sense at all; they are not
‘dubious’—in this sense, at least.16 As a consequence, DUB*, which rules this
property dubious, is not a proper analysis of what it is to be dubious.
I concede that Monism is not a majority view. I concede that distributional
properties are not a majority view. This doesn’t matter. The charge we’re
exploring here is that any putative property that satisfies DUB* is to be rejected
because were it to exist it would ‘point beyond’. Here we have a metaphysic
whereby a putative property satisfies DUB*, but that property is not one that
points beyond. The whole point of this exercise is to articulate an analysis of what
it is to point beyond. DUB* mistakenly returns the verdict that we should reject
the union of Monism and distributional properties because the distributional
properties would ‘point beyond’. We should therefore reject DUB* and with it
the claim that there is anything (non-trivial) that unites the allegedly dubious
properties in virtue of which we ought to reject them.17
4.3. Loose ends
There remains a question: the moon-skeptic position seems absurd. The moon-
skeptic position seems to closely mirror the Lucretian presentist position. It might
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well be true, then, that DUB* does not capture what’s wrong with Lucretianism.
But if moon-skepticism is absurd, and Lucretianism closely mirrors moon-
skepticism, then isn’t Lucretianism absurd too, even if we cannot specify some
feature in virtue of which this is the case?
No. I agree that moon-skepticism is absurd. But I think that moon-skepticism
is absurd because what we might call ‘here-ism’ is absurd, where ‘here-ism’ is the
component of moon-skepticism according to which only the ‘here’ exists; it is the
spatial analogue of presentism. I confess, I don’t have anything original to say
about how I might justify the assertion that here-ism but not presentism is absurd.
But where the idea of only present objects existing and time’s passing seems
reasonable—even intuitive18—the idea that, ‘only the objects that exist here,
exist’ does not.19
What is required of me is an explanation of why moon-skepticism appears
absurd where Lucretian presentism does not. I have provided just such a reason:
intuitively, it seems that here-ism itself is absurd; matters seem otherwise with
presentism. Thus we have our explanation. I therefore agree with the critic from
§4, above, who we imagined claiming that moon-skepticism is absurd. But,
unlike the critic considered there, I seek to explain the absurdity of the position
via its commitment to here-ism, rather than its commitment to some particular
property.
Notes
1. I’m very grateful to the Nottingham Postgraduate Seminar for letting me try-out an
earlier version of this paper, to two referees for this journal for comments and
criticisms and also to an anonymous referee for the Australasian Journal of
Philosophy for comments on a previous draft. Finally, thanks to both David Ingram
and Mark Jago for comments and criticisms.
2. See, inter alia, Markosian (2004).
3. See, inter alia, Armstrong (2004). It’s worth noting, here, that the debate about
‘dubiousness’ is sometimes described in terms of the supervenience theory of truth,
rather than truthmaker theory. I choose to talk in terms of truthmaker here for two
reasons. First, a substantial part of the paper is concerned with Cameron’s analysis of
dubiousness and Cameron talks in terms of truthmaker theory. Second, I think that
there’s reason to think that supervenience fails. See Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005). It is,
in any case, straightforward enough to see how the arguments would go were they to
be parsed in terms of the supervenience thesis.
4. For the canonical presentation of Lucretianism, see Bigelow (1996).
5. See, inter alia, Sider (2001, 41), Merricks (2007, 135) and Cameron (2011).
6. That should make matters easier for my opponent. If we reduce the number of
elements to which we must attribute a common feature, we reduce the number of
dimensions of complexity to the task.
7. Merricks (2007, 135) refers to the properties as being ‘suspicious’. I don’t discuss
Merricks’ view here because, unlike Crisp and Cameron, Merricks does not propose
an analysis of what it is for a property to be—in his terms—suspicious.
8. In some parts of the paper I explicitly mention the other properties: §3 and §4.1.
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9. See, inter alia, Cameron (2011, 58).
10. It’s worth noting that Crisp uses this to then argue that Lucretian properties are
unobjectionable provided the property ‘being short’ is unobjectionable. As he
concedes, however, it’s unclear whether such a property is unobjectionable.
11. I take it to be relatively uncontroversial that, if propositions exist, then there is an
abundant property of being a proposition, in much the same way that there is a
merely abundant property, being a person. Talk of there being a property of self-
identity is rife in the wider philosophical literature, so, though perhaps more
controversial, it’s not unreasonable to entertain the notion here. See, inter alia, Lowe
(1998, 71), Plantinga (1979, 163), Van Inwagen (2001, 49).
12. See Mumford (2006, 477–79) for a more detailed discussion.
13. I’m very grateful to an anonymous referee for the Australasian Journal of
Philosophy for the case and the suggested analysis of what it might be to be a dubious
property. I consider this option here, despite it not appearing in the wider literature,
because it seems to me to be a reasonably intuitive way of cashing out the concern,
even if it ultimately fails.
14. I grant, of course, that the predicate ‘being directed towards’ appears suggestive of a
relation, but, as we’ll see in a moment, such appearances aren’t all that useful in
ontological deliberations. It is the property that concerns me and, as I say, I don’t see
that the property of being directed towards is intuitively relational.
15. At least, some of the Lucretian properties will be non-relational—cases like having
included dinosaurs. There may be more complex cases that are relational—having
included people who were acquainted with one another, for instance. I’ll focus my
attention, here, on the simple cases. This seems reasonable since the charge from my
imagined opponent centred on the claim that properties like having contained
dinosaurs are intuitively relational but are being treated as non-relational by the
Lucretian.
16. Though in at least some contexts distributional properties do seem rather odd. See
Cameron (2011) for what I take to be an odd deployment of distributional properties;
Tallant and Ingram (2012) for an explanation of why these are odd.
17. There might, of course, still be reasons to reject Lucretian properties. For instance,
perhaps Merricks (2007, 135) is right that these properties are to be rejected because
they require instantiation by the world, where ‘the world’ is an objectionably
mysterious object. Some claim that truths about the past don’t need truthmakers and
so urge that we simply have no need for Lucretian properties—for instance, Tallant
(2009). I don’t take a stand on any of these issues here.
18. See Zimmerman (2008) for discussion and defense of this claim.
19. Sider (2001, 46) describes here-now-ism as objectionably solipsistic, but describes
presentism as quite intuitive (2001, 11). To develop his argument a little: if only a
single point in space exists, then no people exist. For familiar Moorean reasons, we
might then move from the certainty of the thought that ‘I have a hand’ to the
conclusion that I exist and am a person and so the further conclusion that here-ism
absurdly implies that I do not exist. We thereby explain the absurdity of here-ism
very straightforwardly.
Notes on contributor
Jonathan Tallant is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Nottingham. His
primary area of research interest is metaphysics and he is the current President of the
Philosophy of Time Society.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 115
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
2.1
9.4
4.2
10
] a
t 1
5:4
6 1
5 M
arc
h 2
01
4 
References
Armstrong, D. 2004. Truth and Truth-makers. Cambridge: CUP.
Bigelow, J. 1996. “Presentism and Properties.” Philosophical Perspectives 10: 35–52.
Bostock, S. 2008. “In Defence of Pan-Dispositionalism.” Metaphysica 9: 139–157.
Cameron, R. 2011. “Truthmaking for presentists.” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 6:
55–100.
Crisp, T. 2007. “Presentism and the Grounding Objection.” Nous 41: 90–109.
Kierland, J., and B. Monton. 2007. “Presentism and the Objection from Being-
Supervenience.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85: 485–497.
Lowe, E. J. 1998. The Possibility of Metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Markosian, N. 2004. “A Defense of Presentism.” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1: 47–82.
Merricks, T. 2007. Truth and Ontology. Oxford: OUP.
Mumford, S. 2006. “The Ungrounded Argument.” Synthese 149: 471–489.
Plantinga, A. 1979. “Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals.” In The Possible and
the Actual: Readings in Metaphysics, edited by M. Loux, 146–165. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. 2005. “Why Truthmakers?” In Truthmakers: The Contemporary
Debate, edited by H. Beebee, and J. Dodd, 17–32. Oxford: OUP.
Schaffer, J. 2005. “Contrastive Causation.” Philosophical Review 114: 327–358.
Schaffer, J. 2010. “The Priority of the Whole.” Philosophical Review 119: 37–76.
Sider, T. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford: OUP.
Tallant, J. 2009. “Ontological Cheats Might Just Prosper.” Analysis 69: 422–430.
Tallant, J., and D. Ingram. 2012. “Time for Distribution?” Analysis 72: 264–270.
van Inwagen, P. 2001. Ontology, Identity and Modality: Essays In Metaphysics.
Cambridge: CUP.
Zimmerman, D. 2008. “The Privileged Present: Defending an ‘A-Theory’ of Time.” In
Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, edited by T. Sider, J. Hawthorne, and D.
Zimmerman, 211–225. Oxford: Blackwell.
J. Tallant116
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
2.1
9.4
4.2
10
] a
t 1
5:4
6 1
5 M
arc
h 2
01
4 
